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Leaders are critical to a country’s success. They can influence domestic policy via specific 
measures that they enforce, and they can also influence international public opinion towards their 
country. Foreign Direct Investments are also essential for a country’s economic growth. Our 
hypothesis is that foreign-educated leaders attract more FDI to their country. Our rationale is that 
education obtained abroad encompasses a whole slew of factors that can make a difference in FDI 
flows when this foreign-educated individual becomes a leader. We test this hypothesis empirically 
with a unique dataset that we constructed from several sources, including the Library of Congress 
and the World Bank. Our analysis of 40  African countries employs the robust technique of 
conditional quantile regression. Our results reveal that foreign education is a significant 
determinant of FDI inflows, beyond other standard characteristics. While intuitive, this result does 
not necessarily indicate sheepskin effects or superior human capital obtained abroad. Rather, it 
indicates the powerful role of the social capital, networks, and connections that these leaders built 
while they were abroad that they in turn mobilize and utilize when they become leaders. 
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Investing in human capital is the wisest and most lucrative investment an individual or a country 
can undertake. Human capital increases productivity both for the individual, who consequently 
commands higher earnings, and for the collective, which enjoys a higher output. Countries that 
want to emerge from underdevelopment or secure their worldwide preeminence have to invest 
consistently in human capital formation.  
Human capital is very much interlinked with social capital, social behavior, and leadership 
effectiveness. Like human capital, social networks, connections, acquaintances, or contacts 
constitute resources that individuals use to pursue their interests and attain their goals. Social 
skills are an important subcomponent of individual human capital, and schooling plays a central 
role in developing such skills (Bowles and Gintis, 2001). People often forge longlasting 
friendships in college. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 119) define social capital as “the sum of the 
resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition.”  
Viewed as a web of social relationships, social capital can affect economic growth. Over 
the last decade, there have been serious efforts to place social capital in the development agenda. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) show evidence that social capital, operating through the channels of 
trust and civic norms, triggers investment and matters for measurable economic performance. In 
poorer countries, where financial sectors are less developed and contracts are not enforced, 
interpersonal trust as a form of social capital becomes crucial in facilitating economic activity and 
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997).  
Leaders matter for their country’s growth (Jones and Olken, 2005), because they invest in 
generating contacts, they have the ability to choose the right direction for their country (Lazear, 
2010), they rely on interpersonal trust and built solidarity. An educated leader can set standards 
for success, place the right people in the right jobs to achieve the most effective performance, and 
inspire hard work and achievement.
1 
                                                 
1 From a new longitudinal dataset based on interviews with twenty-six heads of universities in the U.S. and the UK, 
Goodall (2009), finds that, on average, the research quality of the university or the institution significantly improves 
after the institution appoints a president who is an accomplished scholar. A leader who is an established scholar 
commands respect and signals the priorities of the institution internally to its faculty as well as externally to potential 
new academic recruits, students, alumni, donors, and the media. She shows that organizational performance is 
improved when expert leaders are at the helm. 
1 Free from colonial rulers in the 1960s, African countries faced an urgent necessity to build 
national administrations and to reconstruct their political and economic systems on their own. 
Many Africans educated overseas during colonialism returned to their newly independent 
countries to assume leadership or other prominent positions. However ambitious and eager to 
make a difference, African leaders were, the expected positive outcomes such as economic 
development, increased welfare and growth were hardly achieved.
2 
On the other hand, scientific evidence shows that foreign-educated repatriates can make 
tremendous contributions to their home country. For example, they can promote democracy in 
their home country when their education has been acquired in democratic countries (Spilimbergo, 
2009). In fact, the educational and professional background of the head of government matters for 
the implementation of market-liberalizing reforms (Dreher et al., 2006). According to Besley et al. 
(2005), educated politicians generally can ensure a high quality of government because education 
significantly reduces the probability that an elected official uses his power opportunistically. 
More importantly, educated leaders generate higher growth in their countries. Besley et al. 
(2009) show that a country’s growth increases when it transitions from a non-educated leader to 
an educated leader. Furthermore, transitioning from an educated leader to a less educated leader, 
the country’s economic growth is negatively impacted and the impact is larger, the larger the 
education gap is between the two leaders. This finding that a change in the national leader is an 
important factor explaining sustained shifts in economic growth within a country is corroborated 
by other research (Jones and Olken, 2005). 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is also a major catalyst to long term growth and sustained 
economic development in a country (OECD 2002). It is an integral part of an open and effective 
international economic system and is crucial for developing countries in particular. In an 
“endogenous” growth framework, FDI directly impacts the accumulation of investment capital, 
speeds up technological advances, and boosts human capital accumulation (Barro, 1999). FDI is a 
significant means for technological transfers and contributes to economic growth more than 
domestic investment, albeit only when a sufficient absorptive capability of the advanced 
technologies is available in the receiving country (Borensztein et al., 1998).   
                                                 
2 The African economic take-off was hindered, inter alia, by political instability, policy choices, lack of basic growth 
enhancing institutions and capacity building. For a more extensive analysis on the way of governance and about some 
“policy syndromes” by African leaders see Collier et al. (2008) and Bates (2008). In section 2, we will present more 
details on the “first” African leaders and their characteristics. See also Table 2. 
2 FDI not only varies widely between the developed and developing world, but is also 
unevenly regionally distributed even within the African continent. In addition, the share of foreign 
investment varies widely among the different sectors (primary, secondary, and tertiary) (United 
Nations, 1999). While the economic and social development of Africa have been the subject of 
endless studies and many international resolutions, and while FDI flows have been analyzed and 
evaluated, little is known about the correlation between the educational attainment of the African 
leaders and inflows of foreign investments in their countries.  
In this study, we combine all these elements (human capital, social capital, FDI and 
leadership) and conjecture that the foreign education of the leaders matters for FDI inflows in 
their home countries above and beyond standard determinants of FDI. Because people who invest 
in human capital also invest in social capital (Glaeser et al., 2002), social capital built abroad 
during the leaders’ education period is the latent link that establishes the direction of FDI from 
Europe to Africa. We use unique data on the education of African leaders, FDI inflows and other 
important country characteristics that we compiled from a wide range of reliable sources. Since 
there is tremendous variability in the FDI distribution in Africa, it is important to study not only 
the mean but also the upper and lower ends of the distribution. A quantile regression is thus the 
appropriate estimation technique. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II, we describe the education of 
the early African leaders, their characteristics, and vision from independence to the present. We 
also discuss the economic orientation of the continent and review the relevant literature on the 
determinants of FDI in the region. In section III, we present our model and data and explicate our 
variables. In section IV we present and discuss summary statistics and the estimation results. We 
conclude in section V.  
 
II. From Colonialism to Independence and Beyond: Human Capital and Economic Matters 
 
II. 1. Education, Social Capital and Leadership in Africa 
 
Under colonialism, a number of young African scholars were going abroad, typically to the 
“mother” country, to acquire good education. After independence from the colonial rulers, many 
Africans continued to go to Europe for education that would enabled them to promote well-being 
in their home countries upon return.  
3 The question that has been the subject of many discussions and debates is whether colonial 
education, that is, education that the “first” African leaders received, was in the best interest of 
their own people. By “first” leaders we mean those leaders who took over leadership immediately 
after independence. Interestingly, some of these leaders have been ruling their home countries, 
either as heads of states or as high officials, since independence from colonialism.  
B. W. Mkapa (2010), ex-president of Tanzania, classifies the African leaders who were in 
power before the end of the Cold War in six categories: the visionary idealists, the pragmatists, the 
incompetents, the military juntas, the tyrants and thieves, and a combination of two or more of the 
foregoing. He argues that “not only did colonial education not prepare those who received it for 
leadership [in the sense of helping their countries’ economic take-off], but it was also not directed 
to the solution of economic and social problems of the newly independent countries” (p. 28). 
Like human capital, individuals use social capital (consciously or even subconsciously) as 
a resource that helps them pursue their interests and attain their goals such as employment, 
migration, or community involvement. Coleman (1988) calls this the “appropriability” of social 
structure. Social capital mostly operates through the exchange of information which drastically 
reduces costs, and therefore it also raises productivity. Moreover, social capital is regarded by 
many as a new means to economic development. Some researchers even argue that because social 
capital affects relations among people, it should be an input or argument of the production and/or 
utility function (Schiff, 1992: p. 160).
3 
In general, going to a certain university can be viewed as belonging to a certain social 
group that shares the same values and the same habits of cooperation. In a group, social capital 
manifested through trust and group solidarity can be cemented by the sharing of hardship as well 
as by having common values and even by objecting some of the mainstream society’s rules. 
Viewed as a web of social relationships, social capital provides opportunities and can affect 
economic growth. In the following, when we refer to the human capital that the leaders acquired 
abroad, we include the social capital component. 
The education of the earlier leaders could have been influenced by the political system as 
well as by the actual education received at the higher institutions that leaders attended. All 
colonizing countries we refer to, whether they had a socialistic or a more conservative 
government, had democratic systems, followed democratic election processes, and complied with 
                                                 
3 Social capital is also defined as the “Glue Holding Society Together” on the World Bank’s webpage 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm. 
4 political and human rights laws. In practice, several African leaders failed to preserve and protect 
these ideals.  
After the end of colonialism, many countries proceeded with the creation of sovereign 
democratic countries, often following their former colonizer’s constitution and laws. One 
important point that they did not institute was a “terminal” leadership. Unlike European countries 
or the U.S., in Africa a leader can remain the president for many years, even sometimes until 
death. While an eternal benevolent leader can provide stability and allow his country to flourish, 
the eternal aspect of leadership can lead to monarchy, dictatorship, and abuse of power. 
During the immediate post-colonial era, some Africans continued to go abroad to their 
former “mother” countries to receive education. Given that several “first” leaders are still in 
power, it is difficult to find African leaders who were educated during the post-colonial era or the 
post-cold war era. It is also difficult to speculate about the education and abilities of those 
educated in later years. During the post-cold war era, however, it is more common to find 
Africans going to other African countries for their education than outside the continent, because 
more African countries have built solid universities offering sound education and more European 
countries have tried to keep African students away.
4 
 
II. 2. FDI Flows and Economic Development in Africa  
FDI inflows are pivotal to the economic growth and development of a country. African countries 
need FDI the most. The first prerequisite for FDI to flow into a country is having an open 
economy participating in international trade. Looking back at the African continent, we find 
widespread skepticism about the virtues of free trade and foreign investment. Soon after 
independence and during the 1970s, several African countries imposed trade restrictions and 
capital controls as part of an import-substitution industrialization policy that aimed to protecting 
domestic industries and to conserving scarce foreign exchange (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2005). 
Such an inward-looking economic development strategy not only discouraged international trade, 
but it also disenfranchised foreign direct investment, which ultimately had deleterious effects on 
economic growth and living conditions in the continent (Rodrik, 1998). 
Realizing their disappointing economic performance and the pulverizing effects of 
globalization, many African countries opted for a regime shift. Thus, from the 1970s up to the 
                                                 
4 Constant and Tien (2009) find that colonial vestiges constitute a strong determinant of the exodus of highly skilled 
and talented Africans to their former colonizers countries, even 40 years after de-colonization.  
5 mid-1990s, many African countries favored outward-looking development strategies. As a result, 
there has been relative improvement in economic performance in some countries since the mid-
1990s (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2005; Fisher et al., 1998). In spite of the slight improvement, 
however, the overall growth pattern in Africa has remained anemic.  
Table 1 shows the distribution of the world’s FDI flows over the periods 1970 to 1990 and 
1991 to 2009. It is striking that the developed countries received more than two thirds of the 
world’s FDI inflows in both periods. Developing countries, however, received only about 22% in 
the period 1970 to 1990, and about 31% in the second period. The entire African continent 
received a mere 3% of the world’s FDI flows in the first period and 3% in the second period. 
Evidently, Africa has never been a major recipient of FDI flows and naturally, the continent lags 
behind other regions of the world
5 in spite its slight economic improvement.  
 
<Table 1 About Here> 
 
Another feature worth noting in Africa is that FDI inflow distribution is uneven across 
regions. During the period 1970 to 1990, the leading region was West Africa with 1% of the 
world’s FDI. However, that region has lost its leadership in FDI inflows in the recent decades, 
falling down to 0.6%. Northern Africa has been receiving 0.9% of FDI in both periods. FDI 
inflows is Eastern Africa have remained unchanged at 0.2% in both periods. Conversely, middle 
and southern African countries have been performing relatively well by attracting more FDI in the 
second period. According to the World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2002), most FDI to Africa 
are concentrated in the primary sector. Between 1996 and 2000, the primary sector accounted for 
54% of FDI inflows in Africa. Next was the tertiary sector with 25%, and lastly, the secondary 
sector with 21%. 
Studies on FDI
6 to Africa are rather limited compared to other regions of the world. Basu 
and Srinivasan (2002) study some sub-Saharan countries that have succeeded in attracting 
considerable amounts of FDI. They document that key determinants of FDI inflows are sustained 
                                                 
5 For more details on the underlying reasons of Africa’s economic retardation see Dupasquier and Osakwe (2005).  
6 Seven important elements attract foreign investors to a country (United Nations report, 1999):  
1. The size of a country’s market demand - measured by GDP per capita. 2. A fast pace of economic growth and the 
ensuing positive spiral created with more FDI and even higher growth. 3. Political stability evidenced through the 
absence of riots, coup d’ étas and recurrent changes of governments. 4. Macroeconomic stability. 5. A well-developed 
infrastructure network and a well-trained labor force. 6. A smooth administrative and regulatory environment along with 
transparent regulations. 7. Effective marketing efforts that promote the host country, given that other elements are 
fulfilled. 
6 efforts to promote political and macroeconomic stability, implementation of essential structural 
reforms, and strong leadership as well as a firm commitment to economic reform.  Examining 
Mali and Mozambique as well as some 27 other African countries, Morisset (2000) finds that by 
adopting specific actions in the 1990s, these two countries have been remarkably attractive to FDI. 
Beyond their macroeconomic and political stability, these actions included developing a few 
projects that have multiplier effects on investment projects and mounting an image-building effort 
with the participation of high political figures, including the president. The abundance of natural 
resources on the African continent and how they relate to FDI inflows has been the subject of 
some studies as well. Countries that are endowed with natural resources or countries with large 
markets attract significantly more FDI inflows (Asiedu, 2006; Morisset, 2000).  
On the monetary side, Rogoff and Reinhart (2003) suggest that the investment climate is 
adversely influenced by the odds of a civil war erupting or by ongoing wars. Wars seem to impose 
macroeconomic instabilities, such as frequent currency crashes and high inflation, that are 
deterrents to investment even in peacetime. Factors that are detrimental to FDI inflows in Africa 
are high dependency on commodities, increased competition for FDI among developing countries 
driven by globalization, weak governance (weak law enforcement), and poor and ineffective 
marketing strategies (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2005). 
 
III. Model, Variables, and Data 
III. 1. Empirical Model and Hypotheses 
The previous sections have established the importance of having an educated leader and FDI 
inflows for the economic development and prosperity of a country. In this section, we seek to 
build a model that can address our question:  can the foreign education of an African leader make 
a difference in the FDI flowing in his country above and beyond other standard explanatory 
variables? The dependent variable is FDI net inflows per capita in current U.S. dollars. The vector 
of independent variables includes the education of the country’s leader plus a set of other 
determinants that affect FDI, that are in line with the established theory.  
Previous analyses on FDI flows to Africa have employed either standard OLS or GMM 
techniques that concentrate on the conditional mean function of the dependent variable. However, 
when analyzing counties with large variability and a wide spread distribution (as it is the case of 
African countries) it is often important to look at the entire distribution and not just the mean. 
Multivariate quantile regression (QR) is an especially suited estimation technique because it 
7 allows us to study the upper and lower tails of the distribution as well as to estimate the impact of 
regressors on the conditional distribution of the outcome. Our model is expressed as follows:  
      FDIit = β (q) Edui  +  γ (q)´Xit  +  εit (q)                              
where the subscripts i and t stand for countries and time respectively. FDIit represents the flows of 
Foreign Direct Investments per capita in country i at time t. Edui is the education of a leader in 
country i and Xit is a vector all other determinants. β(q) and γ(q) stand for the unknown parameters 
associated with the q
th quantile, with q є (0, 1); εit is the error term. We assume that the conditional 
q
th quantile of the error term is equal to zero, Qε(q|Edu, X) = 0, but the distribution of εit(q) is 
unspecified. Following Buchinsky (1998), in general, the q
th quantile regression (0 < q
 < 1) solves:  
                 





i,t:FDI β Edu,γ´X i,t:FDI β Edu,γ´X
1





 2)  
 
As q increases from 0 to 1, we can gauge the influence of the regressors on the entire 
conditional distribution of FDIit. However, in cases of heteroscedastic errors, the estimated 
standard errors are understated and robust standard errors should be calculated using 
bootstrapping techniques. 
 
III. 2. Construction of Variables and Hypotheses  
We follow the World Bank’s definition of FDI, which is defined as “the net inflows of investment 
to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance 
of payments.” Using FDI per capita allows us to take the relative country size into account. 
The variable Edui stands for the leader’s education. By education we mean the actual 
learning of the subject as well as the social capital built during the education period. The latter 
could be in the form of general knowledge that the leader acquired about the host country’ 
organization and operation, or in the form of “business cards” that a leader accumulated over the 
years. Our hypothesis is that a leader who acquired his tertiary education outside Africa will 
attract significantly more FDI to his country than other leaders who were not educated or were 
educated within Africa. We construct three dummy variables: The variable Edu_Abroad takes the 
value 1 when a leader received his tertiary education outside of Africa; the variable Edu_Africa 
takes the value 1 when a leader received his tertiary education in Africa; and the variable No_Edu 
8 takes the value 1 when a leader had only secondary education from Africa or none of above. 
These dummy variables capture the precise impact that each educational level and place of the 
country leader has on FDI inflows. In the estimation the reference category is Edu_Africa.  
X is a vector of standard independent variables that determine FDI according to theory and 
previous empirical evidence and εit is the disturbance term. Recent studies on FDI flows to Africa 
have established that first the literature on FDI to the continent is scant; second results from 
several investors surveys indicate that factor that attract FDI to Africa are different from factors 
that drive FDI in other regions, and third there is widespread perception that the region is 
structurally different from the rest of the world (c.f. Asiedu, 2006; Batra et al., 2003; Brunetti et 
al., 1997). An important determinant of FDI inflows in a country the number of years the leader is 
in power. The variable Tenure captures seniority and longevity in power. In principle, it signals 
stability in the country and some guarantee that the status quo will be maintained. The longer a 
leader stays in power, the more confidence investors will have in the country and the more FDI 
should flow into the country. Because of possible non-linear effects, we also include the square 
term of Tenure.  
The next explanatory variable in X is the mode of assuming office, Power. This dummy 
variable captures the effect of whether a leader came to power through a democratic election 
(value = 1) or via a coup d’état (value = 0). The idea is that military coups disrupt economic 
activity in the country and discourage foreign direct investment (Mkapa, 2010). However, even 
when a leader has been democratically elected he stays in power for a long time. Because the 
effect of Power on FDI may change with additional years in office we include the interaction term 
Power*Tenure. 
Other important economic determinants of FDI flows that we include in X are: (i) the 
overall economic standing of the country or its market size. This is measured by the Gross 
National Income per capita (GNI).
7 We expect that a more economically prosperous country will 
attract more FDI (Busse and Hefeker, 2005; Chakrabarti, 2001); (ii) the share of a country’s trade 
in GDP, denoted by the variable Openness.
8 We conjecture that there is a positive relationship 
between trade and FDI; (iii) the Government’s final consumption expenditure as share of GDP. 
This variable is denoted Gov-Exp. We expect that higher government expenditures indicate a 
                                                 
7 Since our dependent variable is FDI per capita it is optimal to use GNI per capita on the right hand side as well 
(Busse and Hefeke, 2005). 
8 The question of whether such a variable is appropriate for policy recommendation or not is beyond the scope of the 
present analysis. For more details see Asiedu (2006) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000). 
9 positive trend, whereby investors know that there will be enough activity in the economy and they 
will receive a higher yield; (iv) the monetary side of the economy is an equally important 
consideration by investors. The variable RER denotes the official exchange rate, that is, local 
currency per U.S. dollar, period average. 
The last set of important determinants of FDI inflows is related to ethnic diversity and civil 
liberties in the country. Recent studies have shown that countries with very high ethnic diversity 
tend to be more vulnerable to conflict eruptions that in turn impede economic development. 
Nigeria and Ethiopia are the most well-known countries in Africa that suffer from conflicts. On 
the other hand, countries with low ethnic diversity can flourish and advance economically, as 
manifested by the case for Botswana (c.f. Alesina et al., 2003; Easterly and Levine, 1997). We 
therefore expect an inverse relationship between ethnic diversity, denoted here as Ethnic and FDI. 
The variable Ethnic is a scale from zero to one, with one representing the highest ethnic diversity 
and zero denoting a homogeneous population. 
By civil liberties we mean the bill of rights, freedoms, and responsibilities of all 
individuals vis-à-vis their government. Civil liberties portray the social as well as the political 
climate in a country and include freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right to due process, 
to a trial, to own property, and to privacy. Theoretically, countries where civil liberties are 
protected and safeguarded should attract more FDI. From the Freedom House World Country 
Rating 2009, we construct the index Civil that ranges from 1 to 7, with one representing the 
highest degree of freedom and the absolute guarantee of individual rights and with seven denoting 
an authoritarian government with no civil liberties. 
 
III. 3. Data  
In this paper we employ a unique dataset, constructed by different data that we collected from 
several reliable sources and compiled. To create and construct the variable Edu, we searched 
several bibliographical sources at the Library of Congress to determine where each African leader 
received his tertiary education. We also double-checked our variables against other sources to 
make sure that we have a clean and valid variable. Similarly, for the variable Power, we gathered 
information from the Library of Congress and double checked our sources. Table 2 contains the 
40 African countries for which we were able to find accurate information about the leaders’ 
education. For each country, we provide the leader’s name, place of education and the year(s) he 
is in power. Significantly, all the leaders in our sample are men. 
10 <Table 2 About Here> 
 
The dependent variable FDI net inflows per capita comes from the World Investment 
Report (2010), UNCTAD online data base. All other economic variables were retrieved from the 
online African Development Indicators (2010) that are provided by the World Bank. For the 
variables capturing civil liberties and ethnic diversity in a country, we used two sources. The first 
comes from the Freedom House World Country Rating 2009. Information about the ethnic 





IV. 1. Sample Characteristics 
Table 3 provides the summary statistics of all the variables described above and employed in the 
model. On average, FDI net inflow per capita in the African countries in our sample is about $42 
and has a large standard deviation. Regarding the education of the leaders, four in ten of the 
leaders in our sample (40.3%) received their tertiary education abroad (in Europe, America etc.), 
27.5% received their tertiary education in Africa and 32.2% of them did not have any tertiary 
education. 
<Table 3 About Here> 
 
The average time a leader spends in power in Africa is around thirteen years. Note that 
most African countries do not have a stipulation for an upper limit for years in power once 
elected. Table 3 also reveals that the majority of the African leaders in our sample (59.2%) came 
to power through democratic elections. Nonetheless, 40.8% came to power military coups 
translating therefore a relative high dominance of military despotism in governance in the 
continent. Additionally, in our sample, GNI per capita in these countries is on average $2,337. The 
overall openness of a country to trade as a percent of GDP is quite high. As trade is an important 
component in the African economies it occupies 70% of GDP. Government expenditures 
constitute about 16% of the national product and the real exchange rate has an average of 216.  
                                                 
9 The correlation coefficients of the employed variables are reported in Table A-1 in the Appendix. Overall, the 
correlation coefficients are within normal parameters. 
11 The very high ethnic diversity on the continent is also shown by the raw data in Table 2. 
On a scale from 0 to 1, ethnic diversity scores 0.65, on average. This indicates that the countries 
and societies under study are not homogeneous and have noticeable ethnic and religious 
diversities. On average, the civil liberties index is at 5, revealing that the index tilts more towards 
fewer liberties. It is noteworthy to mention that, while the index is from 1 to 7, no country in our 
sample scores one. 
Based on raw data, Table 4 provides a closer look at net FDI inflows per capita to Africa 
by the leaders’ place of acquired education. Clearly, leaders with education from abroad tend to 
attract more FDI ($82.7) compared with their counterparts educated in Africa or those who did not 
receive any tertiary education. Interestingly, these figures change when we look at the lower 
quantile of the FDI distribution. The shares of net FDI per capita at the lowest 25
th quantile are 
about the same in all countries regardless of whether the leaders were educated abroad or not. 
However, at the 50
th quantile, it is clear that countries with leaders educated abroad attract more 
foreign investors – almost twice as much. At the upper 75
th quantile, leaders who acquired their 
tertiary education outside Africa are linked with high FDI flows in their country, much more than 
leaders who acquired their education in other African countries. Surprisingly, at the 50
th and 75
th 
quantile, leaders who did not receive any tertiary education attract more FDI than their 
homologues who were educated in Africa. 
 
<Table 4 About Here> 
 
IV. 2. Estimation Results 
Only a multivariate regression can elucidate the summary statistics results because it controlls for 
other characteristics and macro-economic junctures. In this section, we present the results of the 
conditional mean from an OLS estimation as well as for the 25
th, 50
th (median) and 75
th quantile 
of the distribution. In Table 5, we present OLS estimations with robust standard errors from a 
pooled sample of 40 countries and 40 leaders who were in office in 1990. Column (1) reveals that 
education of the country leader matters. While receiving education from abroad or from Africa are 
not significantly different in determining FDI inflows, having a non-educated leader (NO EDU) 
definitely leads to fewer foreign investments in the country, compared to having country leaders 
educated in Africa, the reference group. Hence, on average, educated leaders attract more foreign 
investment in their country, ceteris paribus. Education does not just reflect the actual degree 
12 obtained or sheepskin effects. It encompasses the exposure of the individual to a social network of 
peers that can prove to be very useful later in life. 
 
<Table 5 About Here> 
 
Column (1) shows that the coefficients for the number of years in power are statistically 
significant and follow a smooth concave profile. As predicted, the more years a leader has in 
power, the more FDI flows in the country, albeit at a decreasing rate. Additionally, countries with 
leaders who are democratically elected also receive more FDI. Naturally, this is a positive signal 
that the leader will proceed with policies that will not be detrimental to foreign investors. 
However, because we also include an interaction term (Power*Tenure), we need to interpret our 
results more carefully. The coefficient of the interaction term shows that the effect of being 
democratically elected on FDI inflows is negative, the longer the leader stays in power.  
With regards to the economic determinants, Gross National Income per Capita (GNI) is 
significant and positive. As expected, and in congruence with Busse and Hefeker (2005), the 
higher the GNI is the higher the foreign investments in a country are, holding all else constant. A 
high GNI portrays a higher lever of development that is alluring to investors. International trade is 
another significant variable. The more a country is open to international trade, the more foreign 
investors invest in that country. On the other hand, high government consumption is an 
impediment to FDI inflows in the country. Our results show that when government expenditures 
are high, there are fewer foreign investments. Our explanation is that big  government 
consumption (budgétivore) may be seen as a signal that a country has high debt and therefore has 
a potential solvency problem that deters private investment. In addition, high government 
consumption through deficit spending can raise interest rates and crowd out private investment. 
The last two determinants in the model are ethnic diversity and civil liberties. The 
existence of high ethnic and religious diversity in a country is a deterrent to FDI, but it is not 
statistically significant. This finding is consistent with that of Easterly and Levine (1997). The 
coefficient on civil liberties is highly significant and has an unexpected sign. That is, the fewer 
civil liberties there are in a country, the more FDI flows in. Our explanation is that in countries 
where civil liberties are not observed the likelihood to trample working rights and safety measures 
is much higher. For example, it may be easier to employ child labor and/or have workers work 
13 long hours in unsafe environments. All these lead to lower costs and a more profitable investment 
and could justify FDI inflows. 
  In Columns (2), (3), and (4) we present the results of the quantile regression. Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis underneath the coefficients; they are produced by bootstrapping 
because of heteroscedastic errors
10 (Gould, 1992 and 1997). Overall, the quintile results are 
similar to the OLS results, but slicing the distribution and looking at the different quintiles can 
enlighten our findings. A visible difference is that not many variables matter at the low 25
th 
quantile. This implies that when FDI inflows are very low, there is not much one can do to boost 
FDI. At the 50
th and 75
th quantile, however, several variables are significantly different than zero. 
Compared to OLS findings, a noticeable difference concerns the education of the leader 
variables. At the medium 50
th quantile and in the upper 75
th quantile, the place where the leader 
obtained his education makes a significant difference for FDI inflows. Leaders educated abroad 
attract more FDI in their countries than their counterparts educated in Africa. This implies that at 
the upper end of the distribution, a leader who is educated abroad can attract a lot of FDI, 
controlling for everything else. However, at the low 25
th quantile, education abroad does not have 
any different effect than education in Africa. Put differently, leaders with no (tertiary) education 
are no different in attracting FDI than those educated in Africa at any level of the distribution. 
To our surprise, neither more years in power nor being democratically elected are 
significant determinants of FDI by themselves. However, the coefficients on the interaction term 
Power*Tenure show that at the 50
th and 75
th quantiles a democratically elected leader attracts less 
FDI when he stays in power for a long time, there are no significant effects at the 25
th quantile.  
Next, we find that Gross National Income per capita is a strong magnetic pole of FDI, but 
only at the 50
th and 75
th quantiles. This result suggests that high income countries have the 
phenomenon of convergence,
11 but low-income countries do not. Openness to international trade 
is no longer a significant determinant to FDI inflows. While the coefficient of Openness is 
positive, it fails to achieve statistical significance. Similarly, government consumption is 
insignificant at any quantile of the distribution. Interestingly, real exchange rates, RER, have a 
contractionary effect on FDI, but only in the upper 75
th quantile. This may be the result of 
                                                 
10 At P = 0.000 (chi2(12) = 99.27). 
11 This phenomenon is referred in the literature as a formation of “convergence clubs” (see Baumol, 1986; Quah, 1997, 
and Barreto and Hughes, 2004).  
14 different channels (i.e. relative wage channels, relative wealth channels, and imperfect capital 
market arguments) through which the exchange rates influence FDI (Goldberg 2009).  
Contrary to the OLS results, higher ethnic and religious diversity is a significant deterrent 
to FDI inflows, but only at the low 25
th quantile of the distribution. The negative effect of higher 
ethnic diversity at the 25
th quantile is because the stakes of social instability are higher. Lastly, 
civil liberties are not significant at any quantile.  
 
 
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
A good leader is vital in advancing his country economically and maintaining political stability. 
An educated leader can address challenges smoothly, without creating any ethnic cleavages or 
polarizing the country. An educated leader can also consider all sides, set realistic goals, set an 
example, and lead his country to higher growth. FDI is also important for a country’s economic 
growth and developing countries need more of it, FDI. Nonetheless, FDI distribution remains 
skewed towards the developed world. Africa, a continent that urgently needs to advance 
economically, has received only about 3% of the world’s FDI for the past four decades.  
In this paper, we study the importance of a leader’s education in attracting and boosting 
FDI inflows, beyond other economic and ethnic characteristics. Specifically, we are interested in 
whether a leader’s foreign education makes a difference in attracting FDI. We perceive education 
as encompassing social capital built during the leader’s tenure abroad.  
Our empirical estimation is based on a unique dataset that we compiled from several 
reliable sources. Our sample has 531 observations and 40 African countries. Raw statistics show 
that the majority of African leaders (40.3%) in our sample received their tertiary education 
abroad; another 28% received their tertiary education in Africa. This is contrary to the popular 
misconception that African leaders are not well educated. Still, 32% of the leaders in our sample 
received no tertiary education. On average, an African leader remains in power for 13 years and 
slightly more than half of the leaders are democratically elected while the others assume power by 
a military coup d’état.  
We estimate both an OLS and a quantile regression that can better access the determining 
factors of foreign investment while looking at the entire distribution. Taken as a whole, the results 
from the econometric analysis indicate that having both a tertiary education and acquiring it from 
15 abroad matters for FDI inflows. OLS results show that when the leader is not educated it 
constitutes a deterrent to FDI inflows, thus confirming that an educated leader can increase his 
country’s growth. The quintile results show more clearly that it is an education received from 
abroad rather than from Africa that makes a difference in attracting FDI. It is most interesting, 
however, that foreign-educated African leaders rather than domestically-educated leaders attract 
more FDI in their countries only at the 50
th and 75
th quintiles. Specifically, controlling for all other 
economic and geopolitical characteristics, the power of the leader’s foreign education is 
compelling when the inflows of FDI are already high. These findings imply that the impact of 
education does not only come from sheepskin effects or superior human capital obtained abroad. 
Human capital in this case, embodies the powerful role of the social capital, networks, and 
connections that these leaders built and cultivated when they were students abroad. When they 
returned to their home country they kept this social capital alive, and they mobilized and utilized it 
to their benefit when they became leaders. At the bottom 25
th quantile, there is no significant 
difference between a foreign-educated leader and a domestically-educated leader in attracting 
FDI.  
The duration of time that a leader is in power is important in attracting FDI, albeit at a 
decreasing rate. Similarly, a democratically elected leader attracts more FDI in his country. By 
interacting years in power and mode of assumption of office, we find that even if a leader is 
democratically elected, he affects FDI inflows negatively if he stays in office for long. This is 
quite intuitive since the longer a leader stays in power, the more likely it is that he will switch to 
an autocracy or dictatorship, therefore discouraging foreign investors and contracting FDI inflows.  
A high Gross National Income per capita is another significant magnet to FDI. Moreover, 
this finding holds both at the average OLS and at the 50
th and 75
th quantiles. How open is a 
country to international trade is an important pull factor of FDI, but it holds only at the OLS 
results. High government expenditures significantly discourage foreign investors at the average. A 
high exchange rate is also a deterrent to FDI inflows, but this time only at the top 75
th quantile. 
That is, at the upper part of the FDI distribution a high exchange rate can put a halt on foreign 
investments in the country.  
An interesting finding in this study is that at the bottom 25th quantile there are not many 
characteristics that matter for FDI inflows. The only exception is ethnic and religious diversity 
that can be significant barriers to FDI when we consider the lowest 25
th quantile. This implies that 
high ethnic diversity and its presumed festering civil war becomes relevant and impedes FDI 
16 inflows only when FDI inflows are already very low. At all other levels of the FDI distribution, 
foreign investors are not particularly concerned with ethnic diversity. Lastly, our OLS results 
show that all other things being equal, the less a country safeguards civil liberties the more FDI 
flows in the country. Civil liberties are not a significant consideration to foreign investors when 
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As a Share 
of World 
Inflows 
World 65,533.5  100  810,274.3  100 
  All Developing Economies  14,291.1  21.8  247,719.5  30.6 
  All Developed Economies  51,234.9  78.2  536,695.6  66.2 
Africa 1,719.2  2.6  23,081.5  2.8 
Eastern Africa  150.1  0.2  2,015.4  0.2 
Middle Africa  227.1  0.3  5,846.2  0.7 
Northern Africa  568.8  0.9  7,681.5  0.9 
Southern Africa  115.8  0.2  2,936.2  0.4 
Western Africa  657.5  1.0  4,602.4  0.6 
America 4,898.8  7.5  74,861.4  9.2 
Asia 7,529.2  11.5  149,154.9  18.4 
Oceania 143.9  0.2  621.6  0.1 
Developing Economies Excluding China  13,354.3  20.4  196,489.8  24.2 
Africa Excluding South Africa  1,672.3  2.6  20,667.3  2.6 
Northern Africa Excluding Sudan  566.2  0.9  6,660.1  0.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1,153.1  1.8  16,421.5  2.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa Excluding South Africa 1,106.2  1.7  14,007.2  1.7 
Source: World Investment Report (2010); Own estimations. 
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Table 2: Selected African Countries and Characteristics of Leaders in 1990 
 Leaders’  Characteristics 
Country   Last Name  First Name 
 








Angola  Dos Santos   Jose Eduardo   Sep. 10, 1979 –   USSR 
(Russia) 
. 
Benin   Kerekou   Mathieu   Oct. 26, 1972 –  
April 4, 1991
France  
Cameroon  Biya   Paul   Nov. 6, 1982 –  France  . 





Seko Mobutu  Sese 
(Joseph) 




Republic of  
Sassou-
Nguesso  
Denis   Feb. 8, 1979 –  
Aug. 31, 1992
. Algeria  France 
Côte d'Ivoire   Houphouet-
Boigny  
Felix  Aug. 7, 1960 – 
Dec. 7, 1993
Senegal . 





Teodoro   Oct. 12, 1982 –   Spain  . 
Ethiopia   Haile Mariam   Mengistu   Sep. 10, 1987 –  
May 21, 1991
Ethiopia . 
Gabon  Bongo   Omar   Nov. 28, 1967 –  
June 8, 2009
. Chad 
Gambia, The   Jawara   Sir Dawda   April 24, 1970 –  
July 22, 1994
The UK  . 
Ghana   Rawlings   Jerry   Dec. 31, 1981 –  
Jan. 7, 1993
. Ghana 
Guinea   Conte   Lansana   April 3, 1984 –  
Dec. 22, 2008
. . 
Kenya   Moi   Daniel Arap   Aug. 22, 1978 –  
Dec. 30, 2002
Kenya . 
Lesotho   Lekhanya   Justin   Jan. 24, 1986 –  
May 2, 1991
. . 
Liberia   Doe   Samuel K.   July 25, 1984 –  
Sep. 9, 1990
. . 
Madagascar  Ratsiraka   Didier   Jan. 4, 1976 –  
March 27, 1993
France . 
Malawi   Banda   Hastings K.   July 6, 1966 –  
May 21, 1994
The U.S.  The UK 
Mali   Traore   Moussa   June 19, 1979 –  
March 26, 1991
France . 
Mauritania   Taya   Maaouya 
Ould 
Dec. 12, 1984 –  
April 18, 1992
Mauritania . 
Mauritius   Jugnauth   Aneerood   June 16, 1982 –  
Dec. 22, 1995
The UK  . 
23 Table 2: Selected African Countries and Characteristics of Leaders in 1990 
 Leaders’  Characteristics 
Country   Last Name  First Name 
 








Morocco   Mohammed   Mawlay al-
Hasan II ibn 
Feb. 26, 1961 –  
July 23, 1999
Morocco France 
Mozambique   Chissano   Joaquim   Nov. 6, 1986 – 
Feb. 2, 2005
France Portugal 
Namibia  Nujoma   Sam   March 21, 1990 – 
March 21, 2005
. . 
Niger   Seibou   Ali   Dec. 18, 1989 –  
April 16, 1993
Niger . 
Nigeria   Babangida   Ibrahim   Aug. 27, 1985 –  
Jan. 4, 1993
The UK  . 
Rwanda   Habyarimana   Juvenal   July 5, 1973 –  
April 6, 1994
Zaïre Zaïre 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe  
Costa   Manuel Pinto 
Da 
July12, 1975 –  
March 4, 1991
. . 
Senegal   Diouf   Abdul   Jan. 1, 1981 –  
April 1, 2000
France . 
Seychelles   Rene   France Albert   June5, 1977 –  
April 14, 2004
The UK  The UK 




Somalia   Barre   Mohammed 
Siad 
July 1,1976 –  
Jan. 27, 1991
Italy . 
South Africa   de Klerk   F.W.   Aug. 15, 1989 –  
May 10, 1994
South Africa  . 
Sudan   Al-Bashir   Omar   June 30, 1989 –  
Oct. 16, 1993
. Egypt 
Sudan   Al-Bashir   Omar   Oct. 16, 1993 –   .  Egypt 
Tanzania   Mwinyi   Ali Hassan   Nov. 5, 1985 –  
Nov. 23, 1995
Tanzania The  UK 
Togo   Eyadema   Gnassingbe   April 14, 1967 –  
Feb. 5, 2005
. . 
Tunisia   Ali   Zine El 
Abidine Ben 
Nov. 7, 1987 –   France  The U.S. 
Uganda   Museveni   Yoweri   Jan. 26, 1986 –   Tanzania  . 
Zimbabwe   Mugabe   Robert   Dec. 31, 1987 –  South Africa  The UK 
Source: Adopted from Spilimbergo (2007), Jones and Olken (2005), Rake (2001) and Statesman’s Yearbook Online 
from the Library of Congress.  
1 The exact time in power of the African leader is from: http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/home.htm.  
2 In case where the same leader came to power twice or more times, we only consider his first term. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Codes 
Variables Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
FDI (in USD)  41.56  154.74  -447.00  1935.09 
EDU_ABROAD (%)  0.40  0.49  0 (NO)  1 (YES) 
EDU_AFRICA (%)  0.28  0.45  0 (NO)  1 (YES) 
NO_EDU (%)  0.32  0.47  0 (NO)  1 (YES) 
TENURE in years  13.11  8.87  1  41 
POWER (%)  0.59  0.49  0 (Coup)  1 (Election) 
GNI (in USD)  2336.89  3106.18  180.00  16230.00 
OPENNESS (% of GDP)  70.33  37.01  6.32  275.23 
GOV-EXP (% of GDP)  15.61  7.19  2.29  54.52 
RER (in USD)  216.22  491.53  0.00  9675.78 
ETHNIC_DIV(index 0-1)  0.65  0.23  0.04  0.93 (high diversity) 






Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of FDI by Place of Leaders’ Education  
   Quantiles 




Leader Educated Abroad  82.70 227.02 -31.40  1935.08 0.75  5.70  29.79 
Leader Educated in Africa  6.98 15.55 -5.75  144.62  0.78  2.78  7.09 
Leader with No Education  17.98 69.61  -447.00 296.79 0.18  3.13  17.73 
All Together  41.56  154.74  -447.00 1935.08 0.49  3.56  16.18 
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Table 5: Estimated Results: FDI per Capita and Leaders’ Education 




th Quantile  50
th Quantile  75
th Quantile 
    (1)  (2)   (3)   (4)  
Constant -164.181***  1.456  -16.385**  -25.662* 
 (39.243)  (7.596)  (6.737)  (14.331) 
EDU_ABROAD 1.280  0.642 5.447***  16.252*** 
  (7.909) (1.253) (1.889) (4.602) 
NO_EDU -78.934***  -0.607  -4.305  -6.843 
  (16.610)  (1.704) (2.914) (5.831) 
TENURE 5.225***  -0.037  0.281  0.465 
  (1.419) (0.221) (0.331) (0.497) 
TENURE
2  -0.101** 0.004  -0.001  -0.006 
  (0.040) (0.005) (0.008) (0.014) 
POWER 22.620*  0.905  -3.861  -5.864 
  (12.719)  (2.763) (3.464) (5.610) 
POWER*TENURE -3.637***  -0.086  -0.494***  -0.829*** 
  (0.967) (0.130) (0.183) (0.249) 
GNI 0.027***  0.003  0.017***  0.035*** 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
OPENNESS 1.587***  0.037 0.056 0.091 
  (0.463) (0.028) (0.048) (0.148) 
GOV-EXP  -5.118**  -0.056 0.045 -0.371 
  (2.019) (0.132) (0.212) (0.536) 
RER 0.005  0.002  -0.000  -0.004* 
  (0.011) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
ETHNIC_DIV -6.583  -7.616**  0.983  7.638 
  (19.081)  (3.822) (3.888) (8.540) 
CIVIL  22.170***  0.189 0.730 1.064 
Observations 531 531 531 531 
R
2  0.455   0.037   0.188   0.392 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis in Columns (1) and (2); Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis in 
Columns (3) and (4); Quantile regression standard errors are based on bootstrap with 400 replications; 
















Table A-1: Correlation Matrix: FDI per Capita and Other Determinants in the Regression 
 
  FDI ABROAD  AFRICA  NO  EDU  TENURE  POWER GNI  OPEN-
NESS 
GOV-
EXP  RER ETHNIC  CIVIL   
FDI  1              
ABROAD  0.2226  1            
AFRICA  -0.139  -0.5063  1            
NO EDU  -0.1022  -0.5659  -0.4245  1           
TENURE  0.1827  -0.1106  0.0548  0.0637  1          
POWER   0.0065  0.1307  0.1606  -0.2908  0.1053  1         
GNI  0.546 0.1116  -0.1754  0.0497  0.3134 0.112  1           
OPENNESS  0.4529 0.2485  -0.2901  0.0177 0.134 0.1253 0.5092  1         
GOV-EXP  0.0479 0.1186 0.0159  -0.1399  -0.1218 0.1112 0.2032 0.4677  1       
RER  0.0084 -0.0869 0.0315 0.0614 0.1677 -0.0962 -0.0266 -0.0699 -0.2646  1     
ETHNIC  -0.2859 -0.1133 -0.1717 0.2886 0.0016 0.0668 -0.3855 -0.3173 -0.239  0.1528  1   
CIVIL   -0.0355 -0.0838 -0.058 0.1437 -0.1232 -0.2106 -0.2942 -0.1996 -0.1355 -0.0003 0.1056  1 
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